Module 1.6: Admission Webhooks

Цей контент ще не доступний вашою мовою.

Complexity: [COMPLEX] - Intercepting and modifying API requests

Time to Complete: 4 hours

Prerequisites: Module 1.1 (API Deep Dive), TLS/certificate basics

What You’ll Be Able to Do

After completing this module, you will be able to:

Build a mutating admission webhook that injects sidecar containers, default labels, or resource limits into incoming requests
Build a validating admission webhook that enforces custom policies (image registries, naming conventions, security constraints)
Configure TLS certificates, failure policies, and namespace selectors for webhook reliability in production
Debug webhook failures using API Server audit logs, webhook timeout tuning, and dry-run admission testing

Why This Module Matters

Admission webhooks give you a checkpoint at the front door of the Kubernetes API. Every CREATE, UPDATE, or DELETE request can be intercepted, inspected, and either modified (mutating) or rejected (validating) — before the object is stored in etcd. This is how Istio injects sidecar containers without modifying your Deployment YAML. This is how OPA/Gatekeeper enforces policies like “no pods with root access.” This is how cert-manager auto-populates certificate fields.

If CRDs let you add new resource types to Kubernetes, and controllers let you act on those resources after they are stored, then admission webhooks let you control what gets stored in the first place. Together, they give you complete control over the Kubernetes API.

The Nightclub Bouncer Analogy

A validating webhook is a bouncer at a nightclub. It checks your ID (validates the request) and either lets you in or turns you away. It cannot change your outfit. A mutating webhook is a stylist at the door — it can add a wristband (inject a sidecar), change your name tag (add labels), or hand you a map (set defaults). The key rule: mutating webhooks run first, then validating webhooks check the final result.

What You’ll Learn

By the end of this module, you will be able to:

Understand the difference between mutating and validating webhooks
Implement a webhook server in Go using controller-runtime
Handle the AdmissionReview request/response cycle
Configure TLS using cert-manager for production deployments
Set failure policies for webhook unavailability
Debug webhook failures and connectivity issues

Did You Know?

Every Pod in a cluster with Istio goes through a mutating webhook: The istio-sidecar-injector webhook intercepts Pod creation and adds the Envoy proxy container. In a busy cluster, this webhook handles thousands of requests per minute — and if it goes down, no new Pods can be created (unless the failure policy is set to Ignore).
Webhooks can see the requesting user: The AdmissionReview includes the user info (name, groups, UID) from the authentication stage. This lets you build user-aware policies like “only members of the platform-team group can create resources in production namespaces.”
ValidatingAdmissionPolicy (CEL-based) is replacing many webhooks: Since Kubernetes 1.30, you can write validation policies directly in the cluster using CEL expressions, without running a webhook server. However, CEL cannot mutate objects, and complex validations still require webhooks.

Part 1: Webhook Architecture

1.1 How Admission Webhooks Work

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                 Admission Webhook Flow                                │
│                                                                     │
│   kubectl apply -f pod.yaml                                         │
│        │                                                            │
│        ▼                                                            │
│   ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐     │
│   │  API Server                                               │     │
│   │                                                           │     │
│   │  1. Authentication ✓                                      │     │
│   │  2. Authorization ✓                                       │     │
│   │  3. Mutating Admission Webhooks                           │     │
│   │     ├── webhook-1: inject sidecar                         │     │
│   │     ├── webhook-2: add default labels                     │     │
│   │     └── webhook-3: set resource defaults                  │     │
│   │  4. Schema Validation ✓                                   │     │
│   │  5. Validating Admission Webhooks                         │     │
│   │     ├── webhook-4: enforce naming convention              │     │
│   │     ├── webhook-5: deny privileged pods                   │     │
│   │     └── webhook-6: check resource quotas                  │     │
│   │  6. Persist to etcd ✓                                     │     │
│   │                                                           │     │
│   └──────────────┬────────────────┬──────────────────────────┘     │
│                  │ HTTPS POST     │ HTTPS POST                     │
│                  ▼                ▼                                 │
│   ┌──────────────────┐  ┌──────────────────┐                      │
│   │  Mutating Webhook │  │ Validating Webhook│                     │
│   │  Server (Pod)     │  │ Server (Pod)      │                     │
│   │                   │  │                    │                     │
│   │  Receives:        │  │  Receives:         │                     │
│   │  AdmissionReview  │  │  AdmissionReview   │                     │
│   │                   │  │                    │                     │
│   │  Returns:         │  │  Returns:          │                     │
│   │  Patched object   │  │  Allow / Deny      │                     │
│   └──────────────────┘  └──────────────────┘                      │
│                                                                     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

1.2 Mutating vs Validating

Feature	Mutating	Validating
Can modify the object	Yes (via JSON patch)	No
Can reject the request	Yes	Yes
Execution order	First	Second (sees mutated object)
Typical use	Inject sidecars, set defaults, add labels	Enforce policies, naming rules
Runs how many times	May run again if other mutating webhooks change the object	Once (after all mutations)

Stop and think: Categorize these three real-world requirements. Are they Mutating or Validating?

Ensuring every Service uses type: ClusterIP unless explicitly approved.

Automatically adding a team-owner label based on the namespace the Pod is deployed to.

Blocking the deployment of any Pod that requests running as the root user.

Answers: 1. Validating (rejecting invalid configs). 2. Mutating (modifying the object before saving). 3. Validating (enforcing a security policy).

1.3 AdmissionReview API

The API Server sends an AdmissionReview request:

{
  "apiVersion": "admission.k8s.io/v1",
  "kind": "AdmissionReview",
  "request": {
    "uid": "705ab4f5-6393-11e8-b7cc-42010a800002",
    "kind": {"group": "", "version": "v1", "kind": "Pod"},
    "resource": {"group": "", "version": "v1", "resource": "pods"},
    "namespace": "default",
    "operation": "CREATE",
    "userInfo": {
      "username": "admin",
      "groups": ["system:masters"]
    },
    "object": {
      "apiVersion": "v1",
      "kind": "Pod",
      "metadata": {"name": "my-pod", "namespace": "default"},
      "spec": {
        "containers": [{"name": "app", "image": "nginx:1.27"}]
      }
    },
    "oldObject": null
  }
}

Your webhook responds:

{
  "apiVersion": "admission.k8s.io/v1",
  "kind": "AdmissionReview",
  "response": {
    "uid": "705ab4f5-6393-11e8-b7cc-42010a800002",
    "allowed": true,
    "patchType": "JSONPatch",
    "patch": "W3sib3AiOiJhZGQiLCJwYXRoIjoiL3NwZWMvY29udGFpbmVycy8xIiwidmFsdWUiOnsi..."
  }
}

Part 2: Implementing Webhooks with Kubebuilder

2.1 Scaffold the Webhook

cd ~/extending-k8s/webapp-operator

# Create a defaulting (mutating) webhook
kubebuilder create webhook --group apps --version v1beta1 --kind WebApp \
  --defaulting

# Create a validating webhook
kubebuilder create webhook --group apps --version v1beta1 --kind WebApp \
  --validation

# Generated files:
# api/v1beta1/webapp_webhook.go          # YOUR webhook implementations
# api/v1beta1/webapp_webhook_test.go     # Test scaffolding
# config/webhook/                        # Webhook server config
# config/certmanager/                    # cert-manager integration

2.2 Defaulting (Mutating) Webhook

package v1beta1

import (
  "fmt"

  "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/runtime"
  ctrl "sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime"
  logf "sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime/pkg/log"
  "sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime/pkg/webhook"
  "sigs.k8s.io/controller-runtime/pkg/webhook/admission"
)

var webapplog = logf.Log.WithName("webapp-webhook")

// SetupWebhookWithManager registers the webhooks with the manager.
func (r *WebApp) SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr ctrl.Manager) error {
  return ctrl.NewWebhookManagedBy(mgr).
    For(r).
    Complete()
}

// +kubebuilder:webhook:path=/mutate-apps-kubedojo-io-v1beta1-webapp,mutating=true,failurePolicy=fail,sideEffects=None,groups=apps.kubedojo.io,resources=webapps,verbs=create;update,versions=v1beta1,name=mwebapp.kb.io,admissionReviewVersions=v1

var _ webhook.Defaulter = &WebApp{}

// Default implements webhook.Defaulter.
// This is called for every CREATE and UPDATE of a WebApp.
func (r *WebApp) Default() {
  webapplog.Info("Applying defaults", "name", r.Name, "namespace", r.Namespace)

  // Set default replicas
  if r.Spec.Replicas == nil {
    defaultReplicas := int32(2)
    r.Spec.Replicas = &defaultReplicas
    webapplog.Info("Set default replicas", "replicas", defaultReplicas)
  }

  // Set default port
  if r.Spec.Port == 0 {
    r.Spec.Port = 8080
    webapplog.Info("Set default port", "port", 8080)
  }

  // Set default resource limits
  if r.Spec.Resources == nil {
    r.Spec.Resources = &ResourceSpec{
      CPURequest:    "100m",
      CPULimit:      "500m",
      MemoryRequest: "128Mi",
      MemoryLimit:   "512Mi",
    }
    webapplog.Info("Set default resource limits")
  }

  // Ensure standard labels
  if r.Labels == nil {
    r.Labels = make(map[string]string)
  }
  r.Labels["app.kubernetes.io/managed-by"] = "webapp-operator"
  r.Labels["app.kubernetes.io/part-of"] = r.Name

  // Ensure ingress path has a default
  if r.Spec.Ingress != nil && r.Spec.Ingress.Path == "" {
    r.Spec.Ingress.Path = "/"
  }
}

2.3 Validating Webhook

// +kubebuilder:webhook:path=/validate-apps-kubedojo-io-v1beta1-webapp,mutating=false,failurePolicy=fail,sideEffects=None,groups=apps.kubedojo.io,resources=webapps,verbs=create;update;delete,versions=v1beta1,name=vwebapp.kb.io,admissionReviewVersions=v1

var _ webhook.Validator = &WebApp{}

// ValidateCreate implements webhook.Validator.
func (r *WebApp) ValidateCreate() (admission.Warnings, error) {
  webapplog.Info("Validating create", "name", r.Name)

  var warnings admission.Warnings

  // Validate image is not 'latest'
  if r.Spec.Image == "" {
    return warnings, fmt.Errorf("image must not be empty")
  }

  if isLatestTag(r.Spec.Image) {
    warnings = append(warnings,
      "Using ':latest' tag is not recommended for production. "+
        "Consider pinning to a specific version.")
  }

  // Validate replicas
  if r.Spec.Replicas != nil && *r.Spec.Replicas > 50 {
    warnings = append(warnings,
      fmt.Sprintf("High replica count (%d). Ensure your cluster has sufficient resources.",
        *r.Spec.Replicas))
  }

  // Validate ingress TLS requires host
  if r.Spec.Ingress != nil && r.Spec.Ingress.TLSEnabled && r.Spec.Ingress.Host == "" {
    return warnings, fmt.Errorf(
      "ingress.host is required when ingress.tlsEnabled is true")
  }

  // Validate naming convention
  if err := validateName(r.Name); err != nil {
    return warnings, err
  }

  return warnings, nil
}

// ValidateUpdate implements webhook.Validator.
func (r *WebApp) ValidateUpdate(old runtime.Object) (admission.Warnings, error) {
  webapplog.Info("Validating update", "name", r.Name)

  oldWebApp := old.(*WebApp)
  var warnings admission.Warnings

  // Prevent changing the port on update (could break existing connections)
  if oldWebApp.Spec.Port != 0 && r.Spec.Port != oldWebApp.Spec.Port {
    return warnings, fmt.Errorf(
      "port cannot be changed after creation (was %d, attempting %d). "+
        "Delete and recreate the WebApp to change the port",
      oldWebApp.Spec.Port, r.Spec.Port)
  }

  // Warn on large scaling changes
  oldReplicas := int32(2)
  if oldWebApp.Spec.Replicas != nil {
    oldReplicas = *oldWebApp.Spec.Replicas
  }
  newReplicas := int32(2)
  if r.Spec.Replicas != nil {
    newReplicas = *r.Spec.Replicas
  }

  diff := newReplicas - oldReplicas
  if diff < 0 {
    diff = -diff
  }
  if diff > 10 {
    warnings = append(warnings,
      fmt.Sprintf("Large scaling change: %d -> %d replicas. "+
        "Consider gradual scaling.", oldReplicas, newReplicas))
  }

  return warnings, nil
}

// ValidateDelete implements webhook.Validator.
func (r *WebApp) ValidateDelete() (admission.Warnings, error) {
  webapplog.Info("Validating delete", "name", r.Name)

  // Example: prevent deletion of WebApps with a specific annotation
  if r.Annotations != nil && r.Annotations["apps.kubedojo.io/prevent-deletion"] == "true" {
    return nil, fmt.Errorf(
      "WebApp %s has deletion protection enabled. "+
        "Remove the 'apps.kubedojo.io/prevent-deletion' annotation first",
      r.Name)
  }

  return nil, nil
}

// Helper functions

func isLatestTag(image string) bool {
  // Check for :latest or no tag at all
  if len(image) == 0 {
    return false
  }
  // No colon = no tag = defaults to latest
  lastColon := -1
  lastSlash := -1
  for i, c := range image {
    if c == ':' {
      lastColon = i
    }
    if c == '/' {
      lastSlash = i
    }
  }
  // If no colon after the last slash, there's no tag
  if lastColon <= lastSlash {
    return true
  }
  tag := image[lastColon+1:]
  return tag == "latest"
}

func validateName(name string) error {
  if len(name) > 40 {
    return fmt.Errorf("name must be 40 characters or fewer (got %d)", len(name))
  }
  return nil
}

2.4 Register the Webhook

In cmd/main.go, enable the webhook:

// After setting up the controller
if os.Getenv("ENABLE_WEBHOOKS") != "false" {
    if err = (&appsv1beta1.WebApp{}).SetupWebhookWithManager(mgr); err != nil {
        setupLog.Error(err, "unable to create webhook", "webhook", "WebApp")
        os.Exit(1)
    }
}

Part 3: Custom Webhook Server (Without Kubebuilder)

For webhooks that operate on resources you do not own (e.g., all Pods), you need a standalone webhook server:

3.1 Standalone Mutating Webhook

package main

import (
  "context"
  "encoding/json"
  "fmt"
  "net/http"
  "os"
  "os/signal"
  "syscall"

  admissionv1 "k8s.io/api/admission/v1"
  corev1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1"
  metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
  "k8s.io/klog/v2"
)

const (
  sidecarImage = "busybox:1.36"
  sidecarName  = "logging-sidecar"
  certFile     = "/etc/webhook/certs/tls.crt"
  keyFile      = "/etc/webhook/certs/tls.key"
)

type jsonPatchEntry struct {
  Op    string      `json:"op"`
  Path  string      `json:"path"`
  Value interface{} `json:"value,omitempty"`
}

func handleMutate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
  klog.V(2).Info("Received admission request")

  // Decode the AdmissionReview
  var admissionReview admissionv1.AdmissionReview
  if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&admissionReview); err != nil {
    klog.Errorf("Failed to decode request: %v", err)
    http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
    return
  }

  request := admissionReview.Request
  klog.Infof("Processing %s %s/%s by %s",
    request.Operation, request.Namespace, request.Name,
    request.UserInfo.Username)

  // Decode the Pod
  var pod corev1.Pod
  if err := json.Unmarshal(request.Object.Raw, &pod); err != nil {
    sendResponse(w, request.UID, false, "", fmt.Sprintf("Failed to decode pod: %v", err))
    return
  }

  // Check if the sidecar should be injected
  if !shouldInject(&pod) {
    klog.Infof("Skipping injection for %s/%s", pod.Namespace, pod.Name)
    sendResponse(w, request.UID, true, "", "")
    return
  }

  // Check if sidecar already exists
  for _, c := range pod.Spec.Containers {
    if c.Name == sidecarName {
      klog.Infof("Sidecar already present in %s/%s", pod.Namespace, pod.Name)
      sendResponse(w, request.UID, true, "", "")
      return
    }
  }

  // Build JSON patch to inject sidecar
  sidecar := corev1.Container{
    Name:  sidecarName,
    Image: sidecarImage,
    Command: []string{
      "/bin/sh", "-c",
      "while true; do echo '[sidecar] heartbeat'; sleep 30; done",
    },
    Resources: corev1.ResourceRequirements{
      Limits: corev1.ResourceList{
        corev1.ResourceCPU:    resource.MustParse("50m"),
        corev1.ResourceMemory: resource.MustParse("64Mi"),
      },
      Requests: corev1.ResourceList{
        corev1.ResourceCPU:    resource.MustParse("10m"),
        corev1.ResourceMemory: resource.MustParse("32Mi"),
      },
    },
  }

  patches := []jsonPatchEntry{
    {
      Op:    "add",
      Path:  "/spec/containers/-",
      Value: sidecar,
    },
    {
      Op:    "add",
      Path:  "/metadata/annotations/sidecar.kubedojo.io~1injected",
      Value: "true",
    },
  }

  patchBytes, err := json.Marshal(patches)
  if err != nil {
    sendResponse(w, request.UID, false, "", fmt.Sprintf("Failed to marshal patch: %v", err))
    return
  }

  klog.Infof("Injecting sidecar into %s/%s", pod.Namespace, pod.Name)
  sendPatchResponse(w, request.UID, patchBytes)
}

func shouldInject(pod *corev1.Pod) bool {
  // Only inject if the annotation is set
  annotations := pod.GetAnnotations()
  if annotations == nil {
    return false
  }
  return annotations["sidecar.kubedojo.io/inject"] == "true"
}

func sendResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, uid types.UID, allowed bool, patchType string, message string) {
  response := admissionv1.AdmissionReview{
    TypeMeta: metav1.TypeMeta{
      APIVersion: "admission.k8s.io/v1",
      Kind:       "AdmissionReview",
    },
    Response: &admissionv1.AdmissionResponse{
      UID:     uid,
      Allowed: allowed,
    },
  }
  if !allowed && message != "" {
    response.Response.Result = &metav1.Status{
      Message: message,
    }
  }

  w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
  json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
}

func sendPatchResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, uid types.UID, patch []byte) {
  patchType := admissionv1.PatchTypeJSONPatch
  response := admissionv1.AdmissionReview{
    TypeMeta: metav1.TypeMeta{
      APIVersion: "admission.k8s.io/v1",
      Kind:       "AdmissionReview",
    },
    Response: &admissionv1.AdmissionResponse{
      UID:       uid,
      Allowed:   true,
      PatchType: &patchType,
      Patch:     patch,
    },
  }

  w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
  json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
}

func main() {
  klog.InitFlags(nil)

  mux := http.NewServeMux()
  mux.HandleFunc("/mutate", handleMutate)
  mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
    w.Write([]byte("ok"))
  })

  server := &http.Server{
    Addr:    ":8443",
    Handler: mux,
  }

  // Graceful shutdown
  go func() {
    sigCh := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
    signal.Notify(sigCh, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
    <-sigCh
    klog.Info("Shutting down webhook server")
    server.Shutdown(context.Background())
  }()

  klog.Infof("Starting webhook server on :8443")
  if err := server.ListenAndServeTLS(certFile, keyFile); err != http.ErrServerClosed {
    klog.Fatalf("Failed to start server: %v", err)
  }
}

Note: This example needs the imports "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/types" and "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/api/resource". Your IDE will add them.

Part 4: TLS and cert-manager

4.1 Why TLS Is Required

The API Server communicates with webhooks over HTTPS. There are no exceptions. You must provide:

A TLS certificate for the webhook server
The CA certificate in the webhook configuration so the API Server trusts the webhook

4.2 Option 1: cert-manager (Recommended)

# Install cert-manager
kubectl apply -f https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/releases/download/v1.17.0/cert-manager.yaml

# Wait for it to be ready
kubectl wait --for=condition=Available deployment -n cert-manager --all --timeout=120s

Create a self-signed issuer and certificate:

apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Issuer
metadata:
  name: webapp-selfsigned-issuer
  namespace: webapp-system
spec:
  selfSigned: {}
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate
metadata:
  name: webapp-webhook-cert
  namespace: webapp-system
spec:
  secretName: webapp-webhook-tls
  duration: 8760h    # 1 year
  renewBefore: 720h  # Renew 30 days before expiry
  issuerRef:
    name: webapp-selfsigned-issuer
    kind: Issuer
  dnsNames:
  - webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc
  - webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc.cluster.local

4.3 Option 2: Self-Signed Certificates (Dev/Testing)

# Generate CA
openssl genrsa -out ca.key 2048
openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key ca.key -out ca.crt -subj "/CN=webapp-webhook-ca"

# Generate server certificate
openssl genrsa -out server.key 2048
openssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr \
  -subj "/CN=webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc" \
  -config <(cat /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf <(printf "\n[SAN]\nsubjectAltName=DNS:webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc,DNS:webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc.cluster.local"))

openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in server.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key \
  -CAcreateserial -out server.crt \
  -extensions SAN \
  -extfile <(cat /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf <(printf "\n[SAN]\nsubjectAltName=DNS:webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc,DNS:webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc.cluster.local"))

# Create the TLS secret
k create secret tls webapp-webhook-tls \
  --cert=server.crt --key=server.key \
  -n webapp-system

# Base64 encode CA for webhook config
CA_BUNDLE=$(cat ca.crt | base64 | tr -d '\n')

4.4 Webhook Configuration with caBundle Injection

With cert-manager, you can use the cert-manager.io/inject-ca-from annotation to automatically inject the CA:

apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
kind: MutatingWebhookConfiguration
metadata:
  name: webapp-mutating-webhook
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/inject-ca-from: webapp-system/webapp-webhook-cert
webhooks:
- name: mwebapp.kubedojo.io
  admissionReviewVersions: ["v1"]
  sideEffects: None
  failurePolicy: Fail
  clientConfig:
    service:
      name: webapp-webhook-service
      namespace: webapp-system
      path: /mutate
      port: 443
    # caBundle is auto-injected by cert-manager
  rules:
  - apiGroups: ["apps.kubedojo.io"]
    apiVersions: ["v1beta1"]
    operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"]
    resources: ["webapps"]
  namespaceSelector:
    matchExpressions:
    - key: kubernetes.io/metadata.name
      operator: NotIn
      values: ["kube-system", "kube-public"]
---
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
kind: ValidatingWebhookConfiguration
metadata:
  name: webapp-validating-webhook
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/inject-ca-from: webapp-system/webapp-webhook-cert
webhooks:
- name: vwebapp.kubedojo.io
  admissionReviewVersions: ["v1"]
  sideEffects: None
  failurePolicy: Fail
  clientConfig:
    service:
      name: webapp-webhook-service
      namespace: webapp-system
      path: /validate
      port: 443
  rules:
  - apiGroups: ["apps.kubedojo.io"]
    apiVersions: ["v1beta1"]
    operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE", "DELETE"]
    resources: ["webapps"]

Part 5: Failure Policies

5.1 What Happens When the Webhook Is Down?

Policy	Behavior	Use When
`Fail`	Request is rejected	Security-critical webhooks (deny privileged pods)
`Ignore`	Request is allowed without mutation/validation	Convenience webhooks (optional sidecars)

webhooks:
- name: security-policy.kubedojo.io
  failurePolicy: Fail         # Block if webhook is down
  timeoutSeconds: 5            # Default is 10, max is 30

- name: sidecar-injector.kubedojo.io
  failurePolicy: Ignore        # Allow if webhook is down
  timeoutSeconds: 3

Pause and predict: Imagine you maintain two webhooks. One enforces that images only come from your private corporate registry to prevent malware. The other injects a monitoring sidecar into deployments. If your webhook server goes down, which failure policy should each webhook use?

Answer: The registry enforcer MUST use Fail. If it fails open (Ignore), developers could deploy malicious images from public registries during an outage, compromising the cluster. The monitoring sidecar should use Ignore. If it fails closed (Fail), no new applications can be deployed just because the monitoring system is temporarily down, which is a massive blast radius for a non-critical component.

5.2 Matching and Filtering

webhooks:
- name: mwebapp.kubedojo.io
  rules:
  - apiGroups: [""]
    apiVersions: ["v1"]
    operations: ["CREATE"]
    resources: ["pods"]
    scope: "Namespaced"          # Only namespaced resources

  # Only match specific namespaces
  namespaceSelector:
    matchLabels:
      webhook: enabled

  # Only match specific objects
  objectSelector:
    matchLabels:
      inject-sidecar: "true"

  # Timeout
  timeoutSeconds: 10

  # Reinvocation policy (for mutating)
  reinvocationPolicy: IfNeeded   # Re-run if another webhook mutated the object

5.3 Match Conditions (Kubernetes 1.30+)

webhooks:
- name: vwebapp.kubedojo.io
  matchConditions:
  - name: "not-system-namespace"
    expression: "!request.namespace.startsWith('kube-')"
  - name: "has-annotation"
    expression: "object.metadata.annotations['validate'] == 'true'"

Part 6: Debugging Webhooks

6.1 Common Failure Modes

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│             Webhook Debugging Flowchart                    │
│                                                           │
│   Request rejected with webhook error?                    │
│       │                                                   │
│       ├── "connection refused"                            │
│       │   → Webhook pod not running or Service misconfigured │
│       │   → Check: k get pods -n webapp-system            │
│       │   → Check: k get svc -n webapp-system             │
│       │                                                   │
│       ├── "x509: certificate" error                       │
│       │   → TLS misconfigured or caBundle wrong           │
│       │   → Check: cert-manager Certificate status        │
│       │   → Check: caBundle matches serving cert CA       │
│       │                                                   │
│       ├── "context deadline exceeded"                     │
│       │   → Webhook too slow or unreachable               │
│       │   → Check: timeoutSeconds, increase if needed     │
│       │   → Check: webhook server performance             │
│       │                                                   │
│       ├── "webhook denied the request"                    │
│       │   → Your validation logic rejected it             │
│       │   → Check: webhook server logs for reason         │
│       │                                                   │
│       └── No error but mutations not applied              │
│           → Patch format wrong or mutating webhook        │
│             not matching the resource                     │
│           → Check: webhook configuration rules            │
│                                                           │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

6.2 Debugging Commands

# Check webhook configurations
k get mutatingwebhookconfigurations
k get validatingwebhookconfigurations
k describe mutatingwebhookconfiguration webapp-mutating-webhook

# Check webhook pod logs
k logs -n webapp-system -l app=webapp-webhook -f

# Check cert-manager certificate
k get certificate -n webapp-system
k describe certificate webapp-webhook-cert -n webapp-system

# Check the TLS secret
k get secret webapp-webhook-tls -n webapp-system -o yaml

# Test webhook connectivity from inside the cluster
k run test-curl --rm -it --image=curlimages/curl --restart=Never -- \
  curl -vk https://webapp-webhook-service.webapp-system.svc:443/healthz

# Check API Server logs for webhook errors (if you have access)
k logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-<node> | grep webhook

Common Mistakes

Mistake	Problem	Solution
Missing TLS certificate	API Server cannot connect to webhook	Use cert-manager or generate valid certs
Wrong `caBundle`	x509 trust errors	Ensure caBundle matches the cert’s CA
Wrong Service name/namespace in config	Connection refused	Match exactly: `{svc}.{ns}.svc`
No `sideEffects: None`	Webhook calls fail on dry-run	Always set `sideEffects: None` unless you have side effects
`failurePolicy: Fail` on optional webhooks	Cluster breaks when webhook is down	Use `Ignore` for non-critical webhooks
Not excluding system namespaces	kube-system pods blocked by webhook	Add `namespaceSelector` to exclude system namespaces
Mutating webhook not idempotent	Duplicate sidecars on retry	Check if mutation already applied before patching
No health check endpoint	Cannot configure readiness probe	Add `/healthz` endpoint to webhook server
Webhook too slow	API calls time out	Keep webhook logic fast (<5 seconds)

Quiz

You write a validating webhook that blocks any Pod with more than 2 containers. You also have a mutating webhook that injects a logging sidecar into every Pod. If a user submits a Pod with 2 containers, will it be admitted to the cluster?

Answer
The Pod will be rejected. This happens because mutating webhooks always execute first in the API server's admission pipeline. The mutating webhook intercepts the 2-container Pod and injects the sidecar, modifying the definition to have 3 containers. Afterwards, the validating webhook evaluates this final, mutated state. Since the Pod now has 3 containers, the validating webhook's policy is triggered and it rejects the request, preventing it from being stored in etcd.
A developer creates a deployment, but forgets to set resource limits. A mutating webhook catches this and injects default CPU and memory limits. A subsequent validating webhook rejects the deployment because the environment label is missing. Is the deployment saved in etcd with the new resource limits?

Answer
No, the deployment is not saved in etcd at all, and the mutation is effectively discarded. The admission control process is an all-or-nothing transaction at the API Server door. Even though the mutating webhook successfully processed the request and injected the resource limits, the subsequent validating webhook rejected the overall transaction. The client will receive an error about the missing environment label, and they will need to resubmit the corrected manifest, which will then go through the entire webhook chain again from the beginning.
You deploy a new webhook server and configure the ValidatingWebhookConfiguration with the correct service URL, but the API server refuses to send requests to it, logging an “x509: certificate signed by unknown authority” error. Why is this happening and how does caBundle solve it?

Answer
This happens because the Kubernetes API server strictly requires all webhook communication to be secured via HTTPS to prevent tampering. When you deploy a webhook, you are typically using a self-signed certificate or an internal CA (like cert-manager) rather than a globally trusted root CA. The API server does not automatically trust your internal certificates. You must provide the `caBundle` (the base64-encoded Certificate Authority public certificate) in the webhook configuration so the API server has the cryptographic proof needed to verify and trust the webhook server's TLS certificate during the handshake.
You have Webhook A (injects a database proxy sidecar) and Webhook B (adds a specific security context to all containers in a Pod). Both are mutating webhooks. Sometimes, the proxy sidecar injected by Webhook A is missing the security context from Webhook B. How does reinvocationPolicy: IfNeeded solve this race condition?

Answer
This race condition occurs because mutating webhooks do not have a guaranteed execution order. If Webhook B runs first, it adds the security context to the user's containers, and then Webhook A runs and injects the proxy sidecar (which won't have the security context). By setting `reinvocationPolicy: IfNeeded`, you instruct the API server to perform multiple passes through the mutating webhooks. If Webhook A modifies the Pod after Webhook B has already run, the API server will re-invoke Webhook B on the newly mutated object, ensuring the security context is applied to the newly injected sidecar container as well.
A cluster administrator configures a validating webhook to strictly enforce company naming conventions on all namespaces, setting failurePolicy: Fail. Later that night, the node hosting the webhook server goes offline. How will this impact users trying to create new namespaces?

Answer
Users will be completely blocked from creating new namespaces until the webhook server is restored. Because the `failurePolicy` is set to `Fail`, the API server treats the unavailability of the webhook as an automatic rejection of the admission request. The API server prioritizes strict policy enforcement over availability in this configuration. To prevent this from causing cluster-wide outages, critical webhooks should have highly available deployments (multiple replicas across different nodes) or, if strict enforcement isn't required, use `failurePolicy: Ignore` to allow requests through during an outage.
Your platform team wants to deprecate the use of the latest image tag across the cluster, but instantly blocking them with a validating webhook would break several legacy CI/CD pipelines. How can you use a webhook to prepare users for this change without causing immediate outages?

Answer
You can configure a validating webhook to allow the request but return an admission warning message. When the API server processes this response, it allows the object to be saved in etcd but passes the warning message back to the client, displaying it in yellow text in the user's `kubectl` output. This allows the legacy CI/CD pipelines to continue functioning without interruption while explicitly notifying developers that their manifests violate upcoming policies. Once developers have had time to update their manifests to use pinned versions, you can switch the webhook to return a hard denial.

Hands-On Exercise

Task: Build and deploy a mutating webhook that auto-injects a logging sidecar into Pods that have the annotation sidecar.kubedojo.io/inject: "true", with TLS managed by cert-manager.

Setup:

kind create cluster --name webhook-lab

# Install cert-manager
kubectl apply -f https://github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager/releases/download/v1.17.0/cert-manager.yaml
kubectl wait --for=condition=Available deployment -n cert-manager --all --timeout=120s

Steps:

Create the namespace and cert-manager resources:

k create namespace webhook-demo

# Create self-signed issuer
cat << 'EOF' | k apply -f -
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Issuer
metadata:
  name: selfsigned-issuer
  namespace: webhook-demo
spec:
  selfSigned: {}
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate
metadata:
  name: sidecar-webhook-cert
  namespace: webhook-demo
spec:
  secretName: sidecar-webhook-tls
  duration: 8760h
  renewBefore: 720h
  issuerRef:
    name: selfsigned-issuer
    kind: Issuer
  dnsNames:
  - sidecar-webhook.webhook-demo.svc
  - sidecar-webhook.webhook-demo.svc.cluster.local
EOF

# Verify certificate is ready
k get certificate -n webhook-demo

Build the sidecar injector from Part 3.1 (adapt the code for your Go project)
Create a Deployment for the webhook server that mounts the TLS secret
Create the Service:

cat << 'EOF' | k apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: sidecar-webhook
  namespace: webhook-demo
spec:
  selector:
    app: sidecar-webhook
  ports:
  - port: 443
    targetPort: 8443
EOF

Create the MutatingWebhookConfiguration with cert-manager CA injection
Test the injection:

# Pod without annotation — no injection
k run no-inject --image=nginx --restart=Never
k get pod no-inject -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].name}'
# Expected: nginx

# Pod with annotation — should get sidecar
cat << 'EOF' | k apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: with-inject
  annotations:
    sidecar.kubedojo.io/inject: "true"
spec:
  containers:
  - name: app
    image: nginx:1.27
EOF

k get pod with-inject -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].name}'
# Expected: app logging-sidecar

# Check the injection annotation
k get pod with-inject -o jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations}'

Cleanup:

kind delete cluster --name webhook-lab

Success Criteria:

cert-manager issues a valid certificate
Webhook server starts and passes health checks
Pods without annotation are not modified
Pods with annotation get the sidecar container injected
The injection annotation is set on injected pods
Webhook logs show request processing
Pods in kube-system are not affected (namespace selector)

Next Module

Module 1.7: Customizing the Scheduler - Extend the Kubernetes scheduler with custom scoring and filtering plugins.